

SELECTED EVENTS IN THE CHRONOLOGY OF TERRORISM

1982 – 2001

SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS

(assembled by Dick Atlee, with added detail, and PDF pagination)

Submittal Documents	7
Forward	10
Summary Table of Contents	13
Detailed Table of Contents (using internal pagination)	14
Members of the Joint inquiry	20
Joint Inquiry Staff	22
Abridged Findings and Conclusions	23
<i>The following two items were in the Summary TOC, but not found as headers in the document</i>	
Recommendations	
Final Report	
Part One -- Findings and Conclusions	33
I. The Joint Inquiry	33
II. The Context	35
III. Findings and Conclusions	38
A. Factual Findings	38
B. Conclusions - Factual Findings	65
C. Systemic Findings	65
D. Related Findings	149
Part Two – Narrative – The Attacks of September 11, 2001.....	180
I. The Plot Unfolds for the Attacks of September 11, 2001.....	180
II. Pentagon Flight Hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Salim al-Hazmi	195
III. NSA Communications Intercepts Related to Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf and Salim al-Hazmi	207
IV. Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar Had Numerous Contacts With an Active FBI Informant.....	209
V. Associates of the September 11 Terrorists in the United States	220
VI. Germany—Investigation of the Hamburg Cell	235
VII. The Hijackers' Visas.....	239
VIII. The Rising Threat and the Context of the September 11 Attacks	242
IX. The Development of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Before September 11.....	267
Part Three – Topics – The Attacks of September 11, 2001	302
I. Counterterrorism Resources	302
II. Foreign Liaison	322
III. Covert Action and Military Operations Against Bin Laden	331
IV. Strategy to Disrupt Terrorist Funding	360

V. Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM): The Mastermind of September 11	361
VI. The FBI's Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui Before September 11	367
VII. The Phoenix Electronic Communication (EC).....	377
VIII. Strategic Analysis	388
IX. Views of Outside Experts on the Intelligence Community.....	397
X. Information Sharing.....	406
XI. Technology Gaps.....	420
XII. Technical Collection of Terrorist Communications	425
XIII. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection.....	437
Part Four – Finding, Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National Security Matters.....	447
<i>The "28 pages" (numberings -- internal: 396-422; original: 416-443.....</i>	<i>448-474</i>
Glossary of Terms.....	476
Key Names	486
September 11, 2001 Hijackers.....	487
Additional Views of Members of the Joint Inquiry	491
Sen. Richard Shelby ("September 11 and the IMperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence Community")	493
Rep. Mike Castle.....	628
Sen. Mike Dewine.....	631
Hon. Jane Harman.....	647
Sens. Jon Kyl and Pat Roberts.....	653
Sen. Carl Levin ("Law Enforcement Sensitive").....	674
Sen. Barbara Mikulski.....	677
Rep. Tim Roemer.....	681
Appendices	687
Initial Scope of Joint Inquiry	688
Supplemental Joint Inquiry Rules.....	691
Joint Inquiry Hearings.....	694
List of Hearing Witnesses	698
Interviews Conductded in the Course of the Joint Inquiry.....	703
Counterterroism Organizations Within the Intelligence Community.....	726
Evolution of the Terrorist Threat and the U.S. Response, 1983-2001.....	731
Selected Events in the Chronology of Terrorism, 1982-2001	782
CIA/FBI Failures in Regard to Two of the September 11 Hijackers,	
The Phoenix Electronic Communication, and the Moussaoui Investigation	794
The Phoenix Electronic Communication	796
Moussaoui-Related FBI Field Agent Notes and Field Office/Headquarters E-Mails	807
(withheld at DOJ request to avoid affecting trial)	
GAO Analysis of U.S. Anthrax Attacks	808
CTC Watchlisting Guidance December 1999	823
The joint inquiry in court	828
Access limitations encountered by the Joint inquiry	834